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Abstract 
 
This study examines how quality of political institutions affects the distribution of government 
budget in Iran. We first introduce a mechanism through which this can shift government 
expenditure from patronage to more constructive public spending. Using impulse response 
functions (IRF) and variance decomposition analysis (VDC) on the basis of Vector 
Autoregressive (VAR) model, our results imply that a positive shock towards more democratic 
institutions leads to negative and statistically significant response of military spending and 
positive and statistically significant response of education expenditures. Our results are robust to 
different political institutional quality indicators, ordering of variables in the VAR and different 
specifications of government spending categories.  
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1- Introduction 
Literature and historical evidences show that dictators in oil rich economies depend on 
redistribution of oil rents and if it does not work they stick to repression policies, which need 
well-established military and security apparatus (Wintrobe 2001 and 2012; Acemoglu et al., 
2010). While autocracies have been associated with negative long-run economic development, 
democracies tend to direct their budget more towards public spending that enhance productivity 
and foster growth (Olson, 1993). Iran provides an interesting context to study this phenomenon 
as it has experienced different political regimes: the autocracy of Pahlavi in which the Shah was 
the most powerful political figure and the post-1979 Islamic revolution which deals with 
factionalized semi-democracy.  
The goal of this study is to examine how quality of political institutions in Iran has shaped 
behavior of the state towards patronage (e.g., military spending) and public goods provision 
(e.g., education and health spending). We first introduce a mechanism through which a 
government determines its spending behavior. A simple theoretical framework is used to show 
how an autocratic government is inclined to direct expenditure more towards patronage in order 
to secure its assets than public goods that enhance the productivity of the entire society. A shift 
to democracy would reverse this behavior. Empirically, we focus on the case of Iran to quantify 
the magnitude and significance of political institutions in government military and non-military 
spending behavior. We use Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model and its applied tools, i.e. 
impulse response functions and variance decomposition analysis, examining the dynamic 
relationship between political institutions and different categories of government spending in 
Iran from 1960 to 2006. This is the first empirical investigation of dynamic response of military 
and non-military spending to symmetric and asymmetric shocks in political institutions of Iran.  
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Our main results show that a shock in positive changes of quality of political institutions leads to 
negative and statistically significant response of military spending, as a proxy of patronage in 
economics, and positive and statistically significant response of education expenditures, as an 
indicator of public goods provision, in short term. By contrast, shocks in negative changes of 
political institutions reflects itself in positive response of military spending and negative 
response of education, health and public order expenditures.  
In autocracies a small dominant coalition rules the rest of population. Dictator needs to buy the 
royalty of this limited coalition by allocating more budget and economic opportunities. Military 
lobby has been one of the main drivers of persistency of autocracies in history. The close 
association between the ex-Shah of Iran with the Iranian army and increasing presence of the 
Iranian revolutionary guards in politics under the Ahmadinejad presidency are some few 
examples.
1
 By contrast, democracies represent a wide cross section of society and thus need to 
provide more public goods in a form of education and health rather than securing economic 
benefits of selected group of citizens in return for their political royalty. There are also examples 
for this part within the recent history of Iran: the current pro-reform president of Iran, Mr. 
Rouhani encouraged the revolutionary guard to follow the recommendations of Ayatollah 
Khomeini -the founder of the Islamic Republic- in “avoiding interfering in political affairs” and 
do their job “without requesting its share from the nation and the elected government.”2 Another 
example is related to a set of political and economic reforms under government of Mr. Khatami 
(1997-2005) in which the main agenda was empowering the Iranian civil society and reducing 
the role of militants in political economy. Such large scale reforms under Khatami to increase the 
role of civil society led to anger of revolutionary guards who were observing their economic and 
                                                          
1
 For a review of “The Revolutionary Guards' Role in Iranian Politics” see Alfoneh (2008).  
2
 For more details see http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/04/irgc-iran-rouhani.html#  
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political rents under attack. On 9 July 1999, a group of top commanders of revolutionary guard 
issues an open letter addressing the president Khatami, warning about his reform plans and civil 
society activities: 
“Esteemed Mr. Khatami, how long should we watch with tears and regurgitate our own blood 
while we practice “democracy” laden with chaos and insults, and have Revolutionary patience 
at the price of letting our System go?..... In conclusion, with complete respect and endearment 
towards His Excellency, we declare that our patience has come to an end, and we will not permit 
ourselves any more tolerance in the face of your inaction”3 
This trend is also clearly observed in the provision of productivity-enhancing public goods such 
as education. As depicted in Figure 1, education spending both as a share of total spending and 
GDP was at a minimum level during the autocratic government of the ex-Shah. Following a 
jump in the year of revolution 1979, the share of budget devoted to education went had a positive 
trend (or at least remained relatively high) during the 8 years economically liberal administration 
of Mr. Rafsanjani. The trend continued in the subsequent 8 years term of the pro-reform Mr. 
Khatami, elected as president with 70 and 78 percent of the public vote in 1997 and 2001, 
respectively. The figures had a sharp drop after that the more conservative pro-militant faction 
took control of the parliament, and even more when Mr. Ahmadinejad took office in 2005.  
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 See the English translation of the message at http://www.princeton.edu/irandataportal/laws/proclamations/icrg-
letter/ and its original text in Farsi at http://www.princeton.edu/irandataportal/laws/proclamations/icrg-
letter/ICRG_Letter_Persian.pdf  
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Figure 1. Education Spending in Iran 
 
Source: CBI (2014) and authors calculations  
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This paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we present a review of literature on government 
spending and political institutions nexus. Section 3 presents our theoretical model which leads to 
some testable propositions. In Section 4 we describe the data we use, and explain empirical 
methodology and results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2- Review of theoretical and empirical literature  
Although the relationships among regime type, economic growth, and income distribution are 
extensively explored in the literature, there is little work devoted to investigating the impact of 
political system characteristics on the different categories of government expenditures (Brown 
and Hunter, 1999; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001). Some of the existing studies consider 
the relationship between democracy and the total amount of the public sector. Aidt and Eterovic 
(2011) suggest that political competition appears to be negatively correlated with the government 
size, while the opposite is true for political participation. Moreover, Plümper and Martin (2003), 
Hausken et al. (2004) and Aidt et al. (2010) find a U-shaped relationship between democracy and 
public spending. They suggest that for low levels of democracy public spending is high to meet 
the demands of elites, while for high levels of democracy the usual median voter‟s model 
prediction applies and public spending is high due to popular demand of public goods. For 
medium levels of democracy, however, none of these pressures is active and government 
spending is at its minimum. 
Some other studies have focused on the relationship between democracy and government 
expenditure in a special area such as military, education, and health. Regarding the military 
expenditures it is generally believed that as the degree of democracy increases in a country, the 
military expenditures will decrease. Democratic states are more likely to be at peace and less 
prone to become involved in international conflicts (James et al., 1999; Oneal and Russet, 1997; 
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Lebovic, 2001). Democratic states resolve their domestic conflicts by compromise and 
nonviolent means, providing an environment where international conflicts between democratic 
states are also settled peacefully. James et al. (1999) suggest that two democratic states are more 
likely to have peaceful relations. Lebovic (2001) shows a positive association between quality of 
democratic institutions and the share of non-military expenditures to the military ones. Also 
Yildirim and Sezgin (2005) use cross section and panel data for 92 countries from 1987 to 1997, 
finding an inverse relationship between the level of democracy and military spending. 
There are few studies that investigate the relationship between the characteristics of political 
systems and education outcomes. Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993) present a model where public 
education constitutes an instrument of inter-generational redistribution and also creates human 
capital which promotes long-run growth by raising the human capital of successive generations. 
In their set-up, democratization rises spending on public education and increases both growth 
and equalization of income. Brown and Hunter (2004), using time-series cross-sectional analysis, 
examine the relationship between democracy and education spending in 17 Latin American 
countries between 1980 and 1997. They show that democracies devote a higher percentage of 
their educational resources to primary education, the level that benefits the largest segment of the 
electorate and that is most critical for human capital formation in developing countries. Finally,  
Besley and Kudamatsu (2006) explore the association between political institutions and health 
spending in a cross country analysis.  
In spirit of Rodrik (2007), a case study analysis as the upcoming analysis helps mitigate concerns 
about the crucial effect of heterogeneity between countries in cross country regressions when 
examining the association between political institutions and government spending compositions. 
Furthermore our empirical approach makes it possible to test our theoretical predictions by 
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examining how asymmetric shocks in political institutions reflect itself in allocation of budget to 
military vs. non-military expenditures in years following initial shock.  
3- The model  
We start by introducing a simple theoretical framework that relates a government‟s decision on 
public expenditure based on the strength of political institutions. We present a simple case of a 
small open economy with two sectors to represent a country dependent on trade that cannot 
influence world prices and takes them as given.
4
 The first sector is controlled by the state and 
operates through rents from natural resources (oil). Patronage and therefore military spending is 
a more relevant phenomenon in this sector. A second sector is a private industrial sector ran by 
entrepreneurs who use human capital as a factor of production. Productivity-enhancing 
expenditure by the government such as health and education spending enhance skills and is 
therefore biased towards enhancing the productivity of this sector.
5
 In what follows, we aim to 
show how the political institutions in the country under study shape the government‟s investment 
decision. To fix ideas we consider two extremes.  In an autocracy, the state only considers its 
self-interest and makes decisions maximize its rents and protects its assets against a potential 
uprising by the population. In a democracy, the government acts as a representative voice of the 
people, choosing policies that maximize the well-being of the population, i.e. workers.  
Preferences are Cobb-Douglas over a homogeneous state good Y and a composite differentiated 
good X, which is CES over a continuum of varieties of X: 
    
       
 
,                    (1) 
                                                          
4
 Iran is a follower in oil market and global oil prices are determined to a great extent on international markets and 
affected largely by factors beyond the Iranian economy, e.g. global economic growth, global environmental 
concerns, energy intensity of oil importers, production of other oil countries, OPEC restrictions and speculation 
activities among others (for a literature review on market power of the different members of Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), see Farzanegan and Raeisian Parvari, 2014).  
5
 The state sector may also use skills and gain from education. For our results, it is sufficient that the more skill 
intensive sector (here the private industry sector X) benefits more from institutions that augment human capital.  
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,                               (2) 
 where the elasticity of substitution across varieties of X is σ = 1/(1-α) > 1 and i represents an 
individual. Consumers consider the set of varieties consumed as an aggregate good, X, with 
aggregate price 
   *∫     
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Total demand for any variety is 
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where E is aggregate expenditure and βE/PX is total spending on the composite good X. 
State good 
The state sector is perfectly competitive with constant returns to scale technology and 
homogeneous products. There are two factors of production: labor and natural resources. 
Production function is 
          
 
                                   (5) 
where LA represents workers employed in the state sector and T is natural resources. The state, as 
the owner of natural resources earns total returns to natural resources:  
           (
  
 
)
 
                         (6) 
where r represents rents per unit of natural resources, i.e. value of marginal returns to resources, 
and pA indicates the price of the good produced in the state sector.  
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Private industry 
Each good is produced using only labor. Workers have a continuum of skills with Z∈[0,∞] 
representing the skill of workers. Each worker produces φX(Z) units of the good, where 
∂φX(Z)/∂Z > 0.  Production in the state sector did not require any skills; therefore all workers 
employed there produce the same amount regardless of their skill, φY(0)=1.  
Firms charge a constant mark up over unit costs. In sector X, unit costs of firms is    
    
     
.  
In a perfectly competitive labor market, wage distribution over Z adjusts to equalize unit costs of 
firms. Firms minimize their costs given the equilibrium wage distribution. 
Given the wage distribution W(Z) = CXφX(Z), there must be some worker with skill Z
*
 who is 
indifferent about working in the X or the Y sector. We have therefore w(LA,T) = W(Z
*
) = 
CXφX(Z
*
). This gives 
   
       
      
                           (7) 
where the wage is decreasing in Z
*
 (since it increases LA and w(LA,T) is negatively related to LA 
as it is proportional to the marginal product of labor in the state sector), while φX(Z
*
) is 
increasing in Z
*
. Unit cost is therefore a decreasing function of Z
*
.
6
 Since W(Z
*
) adjusts to make 
the least skilled worker in the X sector indifferent between being there or in the state sector, with 
a reduction in Z
*
 the lowest skilled worker in the X sector is less productive (skilled) than the one 
before, but he is paid a higher wage. Recall that this threshold wage is set in the background state 
sector. Decreasing the threshold skill Z
*
 after which workers are hired in the industrial sector all 
                                                          
6
 Note that φX(Z
*
) is not equal to one because the worker is skilled and has a higher productivity than if it would 
have worked in the state sector which requires no skills. 
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else equal has a positive effect on W(Z) for all workers in the X sector because φX(Z
*
) falls and 
w(LA,T) rises, which in turn increases CX. Figure 2 shows the consequences of a reduction in Z
*
. 
We see that the horizontal curve representing log w shifts up because wages increase. The 
upward sloping curve log φX(Z) + log CX also shifts up because while φX(Z) remains the same 
(skills of workers are not influenced), CX  increases. Furthermore, CX increases by more than the 
rise in w(LA,T) because CX = w(LA,T)/φX(Z
*
) from (7) and φX(Z
*
) is increasing in Z
*
. 
Figure 2. A Shift of Labor to the Industry Sector 
 
Investment in education  
Investment in education increases the skills of all workers. Since skills are not used in the state 
sector, we can consider an increase in the productivity of every worker in the X sector: an 
increase in φX(Z) by a productivity factor ; i.e. φX(Z) ≡ φX(Z,) with ∂φX /∂ > 0. 
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In this situation we know that the equality    
       
        
 must be satisfied. Note that the left hand 
side of the equality CX is a constant, so an increase in  must be accompanied by a reallocation of 
workers from the Y to the X sector to return to equilibrium. Investment in education hence 
directly increases the denominator, which must then be followed by a decrease in Z
*
.
7
 The latter 
lowers the denominator and increases the numerator w(LA,T) due to a lower number of workers 
in the Y sector to offset the direct effect of a higher . 
Figure 3. Investment in Productivity-Enhancing Institutions 
 
Lemma 1: Investment in education leads to a shift of workers into the industry, which decreases 
the threshold skill level Z
*
 and increases wages in the state sector. 
Figure 3 shows the consequences of investment in education in the economy. Since this increases 
the marginal productivity of labor in the industry sector and in the state sector, wages rise 
throughout the whole economy. 
                                                          
7
 As Z* unambiguously decreases when investment in education by the state increases the skills of all workers, φX(Z) 
must increase for all workers, therefore also φX(Z*) increases. 
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Political Economy 
Maximization of the utility of each individual under the budget constraint I
i
 = pAY
i
 + PXX
i
, where 
I
i
 is income, gives the optimal consumption of goods Y and X:      
  
  
           
  
  
.  
Note that income is equal to expenditure as no savings take place. We can rewrite indirect utility 
from consumption as:  
    (   )
 
 (   )
   
           
  
  
   
  
        (8) 
Consider an autocracy. Using (8), the total utility of the owners of natural resources is 
   
  
 
 
  
 
      
            
(
  
  
)
  
  
 
 
  
 
         (9) 
where we used I
S
 = Tr = (1-η)pAY(LA,T) as the income of the state as the owner of natural 
resources in the economy, m and e stand for military and education spending respectively, and 
 is a constant. The expression 0<f(m)<1 represents the probability that the 
incumbent state retains power and therefore holds on to the resource rents. This probability is 
increasing as the state invests in military to defend its stakes both domestically and 
internationally: f’(m)>0, giving an optimal level of military spending    
         
            
(
  
  
)
 ,               (10) 
that makes marginal return of such investment equal to its marginal costs. In addition, a larger 
military spending is optimal at times of turmoil and instability since       is large as opposed to 
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times of peace, or democracy when the population is content and there is no risk of the 
government being overthrown, i.e. f(m) is large and       approaches zero. We can hence state  
Lemma 2: An autocratic state which owns the natural resources of an economy is more inclined 
to invest in military than a democratic regime in order to defend its rents.  
A democracy maximizes the indirect utility of the population, which is 
    
        
         
   
 
       
 (
 
  
)
   
 ,                  (11) 
    
 
       
 (
 
  
)
 -       
       
   
      
       
 ,            (12) 
for a worker in the state and the industry sector with incomes I
A
 = w(Z
*,T) = ηpAY(LA,T)/LA and 
W(Z) = w(Z
*
,T) (Z,)/(Z*,), respectively. 
Equations (9), (11) and (12) can be used to study the political economy of investment in 
education by calculating its effect on the indirect utility of the different groups in the society. For 
this analysis we have to look at the effect of  on Z*, which is always negative as the relative 
price is fixed at the world levels. Looking at (9), the indirect utility of the resource owners is 
proportional to production in the state sector. While the denominator remains unchanged, Y(LA,T) 
in the numerator falls. The autocratic state therefore lowers education expenditure as it would 
lose from a lower Y(Z
*
,T) caused by an increase in . State workers on the other hand gain from a 
reduced number of workers in that sector following a lower threshold Z
*
, hence higher wages. 
Workers in the industry sector also gain from the positive impact of more education spending on 
state workers as their wages also rise due to a higher unit cost CX in their sector. Wages of 
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workers in this sector also depend on the individual productivity of a worker over the base 
productivity of the worker at the margin (lowest skill level in the sector Z
*
, namely 
(Z,)/(Z*,): more skills imply higher gains. Thus, a more democratic state that accounts for 
the voice of the population would spend more on education.
8
 
In sum, the political economy of education institutions hence depends on the distribution of 
power in the society. In an autocracy, were the state makes decision based on its self-interest, 
education investment are not a priority and are diverted to defense expenses that help protect 
their rents. If policies are democratically decided by the population, investment in education is 
more appealing as all workers gain from enhanced skills. As better education institutions do not 
result in a change in PX/pA (no substitution effect) and increase w(LA,T) and hence V
A
 in (11) with 
a reduction in Z
*
, they result in a positive income effect for all workers. Skilled workers gain 
even more because they experience an additional positive skill premium effect in V
X
 in (12). 
Proposition 1: While military spending increases a state’s capacity to hold on to its rents, 
investment in education decreases Z
*
, thereby reducing state’s income from resources and 
benefiting all workers through higher wages. Thus, autocracies prefer to allocate expenditure on 
military rather than education, while democracies invest more in education institutions. 
We now confront this question from an empirical point of view for the case of Iran, which has 
experienced remarkable swings in its political regime in the last decades. Iran is also an 
interesting case as benefits from oil rents rarely get distributed within the society, creating full 
divergence between the vested interests of the state elite and that of its citizens.     
                                                          
8
 Note that even if natural resource rents get distributed among the population and thus benefit all in a democracy, 
education spending would still be relatively higher than that in an autocracy due to its positive effect in expressions 
(11) and (12), which would be added to the negative impact on (9) to measure total welfare under a democratic state. 
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4- Research design  
Data description 
To examine the dynamic interconnections between political institutions and the structure of the 
Iranian government spending, we use the following variables: Military expenditures (ldefetot), 
public order and disciplinary expenditures (ldiciptot), education expenditures (ledutot), health 
and medical services expenditures (lhealthtot), and cultural and recreational services 
expenditures (lculttot) from the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) online database in constant 1997 
prices. These variables are expressed as their share in total government expenditures and in 
logarithmic form. Moreover, we use the Polity index as a widely used measure of political 
institutions (Marshall et al., 2012). This variable describes combinations of autocratic and 
democratic characteristics of the institutions of government (Marshall et al., 2012). Subtracting 
the autocracy score from the democracy score yields a summary measure Polity. This index is 
from -10 (full autocracy) to 10 (full democracy). The higher scores means a more open and 
competitive political system. For robustness tests we also use the objective democracy indicator 
of Vanhanen (2011). We use annual data from 1960 to 2006 for our analysis. Appendix A 
presents the summary statistics of variables in our analysis.  
Our theoretical model leads to the following hypotheses: 
H1: Increasing shocks to positive changes of political institutions lead to negative and 
statistically significant response of military vs. non-military spending of Iran. 
H2: Increasing shocks to negative changes of political institutions lead to positive and 
statistically significant response of military vs. non-military spending of Iran. 
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Methodology 
We use the VAR model to estimate the interrelationships among our variables. The VAR 
provides a multivariate framework relating changes in a particular variable to changes in its own 
lags and to changes in (the lags of) other variables: 
                                    (16) 
Where   is a vector of k endogenous variables,    is a vector of d exogenous variables,   ,…, Ap 
and B are matrices of coefficients to be estimated, and    is a vector of innovations that may be 
contemporaneously correlated but are uncorrelated both with their own lagged values and with 
all of the right-hand side variables. 
We define the vector of exogenous variables as                     , where    and    are 
dummy variables capturing the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the Iran–Iraq war (1980–88), 
respectively. Since only lagged values of the endogenous variables appear on the right hand side 
of the equation, simultaneity is not an issue and OLS yields consistent estimates. 
We use an unrestricted VAR models in levels. Firstly, structural VAR models are „very often 
misspecified‟ (Tijerina-Guajardo and Pagan, 2003). Secondly, the Phillips-Perron and ADF unit 
root tests indicate that all variables are I(1)
9
. Since all the variables are non-stationary but 
cointegrated, differencing leads to loss of long run information. Sims (1980), Sims, Stock and 
Watson (1990), Doan (2000) and Fuller (1976) have argued against differencing. After all, in this 
study we are interested in impulse response functions rather than interpreting each coefficient of 
the VAR model (see also Farzanegan and Markwardt, 2009, Farzanegan, 2011, Farzanegan and 
Raesian Parvari, 2014 and Dizaji and van Bergeijk, 2013 for the similar approach). Thirdly, in 
                                                          
9
 These tests include a constant but not a time trend, as recommended by Dickey and Fuller (1979). To determine the 
number of cointegrating vectors we use the approach of Johansen and Juselius (1990). The test statistics indicate that 
the hypothesis of no cointegration among the variables can be rejected for Iran. The results reveal that at least three 
cointegrating vectors exist among the variables of interest. 
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the short term, which is especially important in our analysis, an unrestricted VAR shows a better 
performance than a Vector Error Correction Model (for more details see Naka and Tufte, 1997; 
Engle and Yoo, 1987, Clements and Hendry, 1995 and Hoffman and Rasche, 1996). 
The main applied tools in the VAR models estimation are the impulse response functions (IRF) 
and the variance decomposition analyses (VDC). The dynamic response of macroeconomic 
variables to innovations in a particular variable can be traced out using the simulated responses 
of the estimated VAR system (IRF). Thus, the IRF allows us to examine the dynamic effects of 
shocks to a particular variable (for example democracy) on the different categories of 
government expenditures. Through IRF we can observe the magnitude and statistical 
significance of such responses to one standard deviation increase in democracy related variable 
error (see Stock and Watson, 2001 for more details on IRF). Variance decomposition analysis 
shows the role and importance of a specific variable innovation in explaining the variance of 
other variables in the system.  
Empirical results 
We use a VAR model with six variables to examine the impact of political changes in Iran on the 
different categories of government expenditures. In our unrestricted VAR model, the vector of 
endogenous variables is as follows: 
                                                           
This is our first choice as the Cholesky ordering in the VAR system. The first variable in a pre-
specified Cholesky ordering has an immediate impact on all other variables (different kinds of 
government spending) in the system, excluding the first variable and so on. Health, military and 
disciplinary expenditures followed the first variable in the Cholesky ordering. Finally, education 
and cultural expenditures are categorized as the most endogenous variables in the VAR system. 
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The Iranian government usually changes the share of these two latter costs to increase or 
maintain military, security, and health costs (we have followed Farzanegan (2011) in ordering of 
expenditure variables in Iran). We assume that health expenditures are rather sticky, so that they 
are not affected contemporaneously by other kinds of expenditures. After all, health related 
issues are one of the top priorities of most governments and they cannot be neglected easily. 
Military and disciplinary expenditures are also sticky but can still be adjusted more easily during 
peace time. Finally, political institution quality is the first variable in ordering. This is due to the 
fact that institutions are to a large extent exogenous in respect to domestic economy. There are 
historical, cultural, geographical factors which shape institutions. Institutions affect all other 
variables in the VAR system instantly but get affected by them with some lags.  
Determining an optimum lag length for a VAR model is also important. Economic theory usually 
does not provide any definite guidelines on the appropriate level of lag length in a VAR model. 
For finding the optimum lag we use information criteria such as LR, FPE (final prediction error), 
AIC (Akaike information criterion), SC (Schwarz information criterion), and HQ (Hannan–
Quinn information criterion). We select the lag length of 2 on the basis of the LR, FPE, and AIC 
criteria and also with respect to stability and diagnostic tests.  
Impulse response functions 
In this study, the impulse response functions trace out the simulated response of current and 
future values of all endogenous variables such as different categories of the Iranian government 
expenditures (military, education, disciplinary, health, and cultural) to a one standard deviation 
increasing shock in the political quality of institution. In other words, we estimate the direction 
and significance of military spending response (among other responses) to political institutions 
shocks over time after initial shock. The middle line in IRFs displays the response of different 
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government expenditures to a one standard deviation shock in Polity variable. The dotted lines 
represent confidence bands at 68% confidence intervals which are built by using 1000 Monte 
Carlos simulations (see Sims and Zha, 1999 who suggest using one standard deviation for error 
bands in the IRFs). If the confidence intervals include the zero horizontal line, then the impulse 
response for that specific period after initial shock is not statistically significant (Berument et al., 
2010). In other words, the null hypothesis of “no effects of political variable” on the specific 
government expenditure cannot be rejected. The horizontal line in IRFs shows the time period 
(years) after the initial shock. The vertical line in IRFs shows the magnitude of response to 
shocks. Figure 4 displays the impulse responses of different categories of the Iranian government 
expenditures to a one standard deviation shock in Polity for a period of 1960–2006.  
The Polity shock was identified on the basis of a standard Cholesky factorization, ordering Polity 
first followed by health, military, security, education and cultural expenditures (as % of total 
expenditures and all variables in logarithmic form except for Polity). Figure 4 shows that the 
increasing shocks to Polity (higher political openness) have statistically significant and negative 
effect on government military expenditures. Military spending reduction in the short term (3 
years after democratic shock) is statistically significant.  This is in line with previous literature in 
which democratic development of the political system is associated with lower size of patronage 
spending. Interesting the short term responses of education, health, disciplinary and order 
spending to increasing shocks in Polity index is positive and significant.  
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Figure 4. Impulse responses to one standard deviation shock in Polity index 
Note: The graphs show impulse responses of different kinds of government spending (as % of total government 
spending) to one-standard-deviation increasing shocks in Polity. The dotted lines represent ±1 standard deviation. 
The deviation from the baseline scenario of no shocks is on the vertical axis; the periods (years) after the shock are 
on the horizontal axis. The vertical axis shows the magnitude of the responses. All variables (except for Polity 
index) are used in logarithmic and real form. 
 
Also we have examined the diagnostic statistics of the estimated VAR model. For stability of our 
model, Figure 5 shows the AR graph which reports the inverse roots of the characteristic AR 
polynomial. This figure shows that in the VAR model all roots have modulus less than one and 
lie inside the unit circle and the VAR model is stable (or stationary). 
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Figure 5. Inverse roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial 
 
 
Moreover the results of autocorrelation LM test in Table 1 show lack of auto-correlation in the 
estimated VAR model‟s residuals. Overall our diagnostic criteria show that our estimated VAR 
model which is a basis for the impulse response functions in Figure 4 is stable and satisfactory. 
 
Table 1. VAR residual Serial correlation LM test 
Lags LM-Test P-value 
1 47.4 0.09 
2 34.2 0.55 
3 42.5 0.21 
4 23.3 0.94 
5 46.9 0.10 
6 35.3 0.50 
7 42.2 0.21 
8 35.3 0.49 
Note: Null hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag order h 
 
Variance decomposition 
How much of the variance in military spending (and other forms of spending) is explained by 
shocks in the military spending and how much is explained by shocks in the political institutions 
(among the shocks in other variables)? The variance decomposition (VDC) results in Table 2 
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shows the variance of each variable from each source of shock. The first vertical column tells the 
number of years following a shock to which the decomposition applies and the row figures gives 
the fraction of variance explained by the shock source. 
Table 2 shows that for almost all variables, the largest portion of variation is explained by their 
own trend in the first year. Hence at the start of the simulations the historical trend of each 
variable explains a large part of its own variation. Polity shocks play an important role in 
explaining the variation of the other variables in the long run (Its contributions in explaining the 
shocks to ldefetot and ledutot are about 14% and 19 % in 10
th
 year). The contribution of Polity 
shocks to government health expenditure shocks was about 10 % in the first year rising to about 
26 % in the eighth year. The major part of the variations in military expenditures is explained by 
its own shocks in all years. However the shocks to Polity and disciplinary expenditures also 
affect the variance of the military expenditures significantly.  
As is evidenced in table 2, shocks to cultural expenditures explained about 31 and 28 % of 
variation of education expenditures and disciplinary expenditures in the 10
th
 year. This implies 
that considerable causalities can exist from cultural expenditures to education expenditures and 
disciplinary expenditures. Additionally, the results show that forecast errors in Polity other than 
its own variations are mostly due to variations in education expenditures, disciplinary 
expenditures and military expenditures respectively.  
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Table 2. Variance decomposition 
shock 
source POLITY LHEALTHTOT LDEFETOT LDICIPTOT LEDUTOT LCULTTOT 
Variance decomposition of POLITY 
1 Year 100 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 Years 87.50 1.64 0.04 5.33 5.47 0.00 
5 Years 62.03 1.76 2.36 19.76 13.70 0.38 
8 Years 52.16 1.81 3.86 20.06 21.62 0.48 
10 Years 51.18 1.79 4.61 19.70 21.86 0.86 
Variance decomposition of LHEALTHTOT 
1 Year 6.79 93.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 Years 11.32 77.02 0.96 8.27 1.67 0.75 
5 Years 20.47 43.86 0.93 18.63 1.75 14.36 
8 Years 26.24 30.01 2.97 22.59 8.23 9.95 
10 Years 22.78 26.13 4.51 22.67 15.08 8.83 
Variance decomposition of LDEFETOT 
1 Year 9.97 4.58 85.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 Years 11.09 4.08 80.16 2.99 1.13 0.53 
5 Years 13.87 5.26 68.93 8.19 1.00 2.75 
8 Years 13.79 6.87 54.25 15.59 4.61 4.90 
10 Years 13.73 6.33 49.85 16.78 8.37 4.94 
Variance decomposition of LDICIPTOT 
1 Year 9.8 6.97 6.18 77.04 0.00 0.00 
2 Years 18.30 3.68 5.20 62.50 0.87 9.45 
5 Years 11.96 2.40 3.14 47.56 2.65 32.30 
8 Years 10.65 5.01 2.83 48.79 2.77 29.95 
10 Years 11.33 5.45 2.73 48.72 2.94 28.83 
Variance decomposition of LEDUTOT 
1 Year 9.26 14.03 2.89 8.84 64.98 0.00 
2 Years 22.38 10.11 2.80 4.07 51.25 9.37 
5 Years 19.50 7.66 1.81 6.69 33.70 30.64 
8 Years 19.24 8.04 3.41 7.27 29.58 32.47 
10 Years 18.60 8.56 4.00 7.99 29.48 31.37 
Variance decomposition of LCULTTOT 
1 Year 0.38 0.19 6.95 2.16 0.43 89.90 
2 Years 0.87 3.03 4.77 1.56 1.66 88.11 
5 Years 8.28 6.23 5.14 3.41 3.85 73.07 
8 Years 9.30 6.83 6.70 4.79 10.33 62.05 
10 Years 11.70 6.95 6.29 8.77 9.66 56.62 
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Robustness analyses 
a. Generalized impulse responses 
Ordering of variables in the VAR system is important in order to calculate the IRFs and VDC 
analyses. Different ordering may result in different IRF results. In order to avoid the difficulties 
of identifying orthogonal shocks in VAR models, Pesaran and Shin (1998) introduced 
Generalized Impulse Responses (GIR). The GIR functions construct an orthogonal set of 
innovations that does not depend on the VAR ordering. For comparison, we calculate the 
generalized impulse responses of the different compositions of government spending to total 
government spending ratio to a one standard deviation increasing shock in Polity. The responses 
are similar to those which we obtained using Cholesky one standard innovation
10
.  
b. Alternative definition for quality of political institutions variable (Vanhenen index) 
We use also an alternative institutional quality indicator called Vanhanen index (VI). The 
Vanhanen index of democratization is defined as the product of two underlying indices for 
political competition and political participation (Vanhanen, 2011). Since considering the effects 
of political changes on the different categories of the government expenditures is a key issue of 
our analysis, it is important Polity and VI measures do not only differ conceptually, but that their 
measurement also differs (Polity scores are subjective/judgmental while Vanhanen deploys 
numerical voting records). Consequently, the two indicators show different patterns of variation. 
The Vanhanen index is taken directly from the Finnish Social Science Data Archive (Vanhanen, 
2011).  
                                                          
10
 Since the GIR results are identical to those obtained by the Cholesky ordering, we have not reported them here. 
They are available upon request. 
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For this purpose we re-estimate the VAR model using the same Cholesky ordering (with 
Vanhanen index instead of Polity) as in previous analysis. Considering the different lag criteria, 
we use 2 lags as the optimum number of lags in our analysis. We also control for the exogenous 
shocks of the Islamic revolution and the war period with Iraq. The VAR stability condition test 
(Roots of Characteristic Polynomial) indicates that the VAR satisfies the stability condition. The 
impulse response analysis, using Vanhanen index as a shock variable is presented in Figure 6. 
Looking at Figure 6 shows that response of disciplinary services and education spending to 
shocks in Vanhanen index is positive and significant in short term. However, military spending 
negative response is not statistically significant. Possibly, this is because we should make 
differences between positive shocks and negative shocks as it has been discussed in the literature 
of asymmetric shocks by Mork (1989) and Hamilton (1996).  
In line with Mork‟s work which has proposed an asymmetric definition of oil prices in order to 
distinguish between positive and negative oil price shocks, we define the positive and negative 
changes in Vanhanen index (VI) as follows: 
MVIt+ = max (0, (VIt-VIt-1))          (17) 
MVIt- = min (0, (VIt-VIt-1))            (18) 
where VIt is Vanhenen index in time t. For more comprehensive details on asymmetric shocks 
see Mork (1994). 
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Figure 6. Impulse responses to one standard deviation shock in Vanhanen index 
 
Note: The graphs show impulse responses of different kinds of government spending (as % of total government 
spending) to one-standard-deviation shocks in Vanhanen. The dotted lines represent ±1 standard deviation. The 
deviation from the baseline scenario of no shocks is on the vertical axis; the periods (years) after the shock are on 
the horizontal axis. The vertical axis shows the magnitude of the responses. All variables (except for Vanhanen 
index) are used in logarithmic form. 
 
Figure 7 shows IRFs based on one standard deviation shock to positive changes in Vanhanen 
index. We use 1 lag of endogenous variables on the basis of different lag criteria, controlling for 
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revolution and war with Iraq exogenous shocks. The results of stability test on our VAR model 
are also satisfactory
11
.  
Figure 7. Impulse responses to one standard deviation shock in positive changes of Vanhanen 
index (MVI+) 
 
Note: The graphs show impulse responses of different kinds of government spending (as % of total government 
spending) to one-standard-deviation shocks in positive changes of Vanhanen. The dotted lines represent ±1 standard 
deviation. The deviation from the baseline scenario of no shocks is on the vertical axis; the periods (years) after the 
shock are on the horizontal axis. The vertical axis shows the magnitude of the responses. All variables (except for 
Vanhanen index) are used in logarithmic form. 
 
                                                          
11
 These results are available upon request. 
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Following shocks in positive changes of the Vanhanen index of democracy, we can see a 
negative response of military spending which is also statistically significant until five years after 
initial positive democracy shocks. The military spending response reaches its lowest level in the 
second year after positive shock in democracy. Education and disciplinary (public order) 
spending show a positive response to positive democracy shocks which reached their maximum 
in the second year after shock. These responses are also statistically significant for the first 4 
years after initial shock. There results show that positive development in democratic institutions 
lead to lower patronage spending and higher provision of goods and services which target a 
larger portion of population demands rather than meeting a small military group.  
But what are the reflections of negative changes in democratic quality of institutions? Figure 8 
illustrates the response of the relative share of different components of government spending in 
total budget to negative changes in Vanhanen index. We use 1 lag of endogenous variables on 
the basis of different lag criteria, controlling for revolution and war with Iraq exogenous 
shocks
12
.   
A one standard deviation increase in absolute values of “negative changes” of Vanhanen index 
for Iran accompanied with negative responses of the relative shares of government expenditures 
in health, disciplinary and education. However, these responses are only significant in the first 
and second years after initial shock. Interesting is also the positive response of military spending 
to negative developments in democratic institutions. The positive response of military is only 
statistically significant in the first year after initial negative changes of democracy in Iran. This is 
again the line of our theoretical expectations. Less democratic states need to spend more on a 
selected portion of population and society which may provide physical support at the time of 
                                                          
12
 The estimated VAR model satisfied the stability and cointegration conditions. The results of these tests are 
available upon request. 
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emergency such as revolutions or riots. The opportunity cost of military spending under negative 
democratic developments is also high: less funding will be available for education, health and 
public order.  
Figure 8. Impulse responses to one standard deviation shock in negative changes of Vanhanen 
index (MVI-) 
 
Note: The graphs show impulse responses of different kinds of government spending (as % of total government 
spending) to one-standard-deviation shocks in negative changes of Vanhanen. The dotted lines represent ±1 standard 
deviation. The deviation from the baseline scenario of no shocks is on the vertical axis; the periods (years) after the 
shock are on the horizontal axis. The vertical axis shows the magnitude of the responses. All variables (except for 
Vanhanen index) are used in logarithmic form. 
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In addition to Mork‟s approach in defining the asymmetric shocks, we also use another definition 
suggested by Hamilton (1996). In consistence with Hamilton‟s work which has proposed an 
asymmetric definition of oil prices, we define the positive and negative changes in Vanhanen 
index (VI) as follows: 
HVIt+ = max [0, ((HIt)-max ((HIt-1),…, (HIt-4))]         (19) 
HVIt- = min [0, ((HIt)-min ((HIt-1),…,(HIt-4))]            (20) 
Our findings show that the responses with Hamilton‟s definition of asymmetric shocks are 
similar to those which we obtained using Mork‟s definition. Therefore we have not reported 
them here
13
. 
c. Using the ratio of government expenditures to GDP 
As an alternative specification, we employ the ratio of each components of government spending 
to GDP instead of their relative share in budget in our impulse response analysis. How 
innovations in political variable (Polity) affect the distribution of different categories of 
government spending to GDP ratio? First, we estimate an unrestricted VAR model with an 
optimum lag number of 2 (on the basis of different lag criteria) and Cholesky ordering of [Polity, 
health to GDP, military to GDP, disciplinary to GDP, education to GDP, and cultural to GDP]. 
As in previous analysis, we include revolution and war dummy variables as exogenous shocks. 
The diagnostic statistics such as VAR stability condition show that no root lies outside of the unit 
circle and the model is stable. The model also does not show a specific problem with residual 
autocorrelation on the basis of LM test. Moreover the results of cointegration tests reveal that at 
least three co-integrating vectors exist among the variables of interest
14
.  
                                                          
13
 The results with Hamilton‟s definition of asymmetric shocks are available upon request. 
14
 The diagnostic statistic results are available upon request. 
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Figure 9. Impulse responses to one standard deviation shock in POLITY index 
 
Note: The graphs show impulse responses of different kinds of government spending (as % of GDP) to one-
standard-deviation shocks in Polity index. The dotted lines represent ±1 standard deviation. The deviation from the 
baseline scenario of no shocks is on the vertical axis; the periods (years) after the shock are on the horizontal axis. 
The vertical axis shows the magnitude of the responses. All variables (except for Polity index) are used in 
logarithmic form. 
Figure 9 shows that a one standard deviation increasing shock in Polity accompanied by initially 
negative and significant responses in military spending to GDP and positive and significant 
responses in education spending to GDP within the first 2 years after initial shock, reinforcing 
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our earlier results using relative share of spending in the government budget.
15
 Appendix B 
summarizes the main results of impulse response analyses in our study.  
5- Conclusion 
We have examined how positive and negative shocks in political institutions of Iran shape the 
government budget allocation to military versus productivity enhancing public goods such as 
education.  
A simple theoretical framework is introduced to show the vested interests of different groups in a 
small resource-oriented economy such as Iran that is dependent on imports and cannot 
significantly impact world prices. The idea is to show how the political regime in a country can 
determine the target of government spending, namely military to defend its assets versus 
productivity-enhancing public expenditure. An autocratic state prefers expenditure on patronage 
to increase its rents and longevity, whereas a democratic state where the workers play the role of 
the median voter tend to favor labor productivity enhancing public goods that also result in the 
expansion of the industry and higher wages.   
Using annual data from 1960 to 2006 and impulse response analysis on the basis of unrestricted 
VAR model, we show that response of military spending to positive changes in quality 
democratic institutions in Iran is negative and statistically significant for 3 years after initial 
shock. On the contrary, education spending responds positively to a positive shock towards 
                                                          
15 In addition, we have estimated a VAR model using the per capita form of each components of government 
spending. We have estimated an unrestricted VAR model with a Cholesky ordering of [polity, lhealthcap, ldefecap, 
ldicipcap, leducap, lcultcap]. We can find the significant responses only for the defense expenditures. The IRFs 
show that defense expenditures response both negatively and significantly (within the first 2 years after initial 
shock) to one standard deviation increasing shock in Polity. We cannot find significant responses regarding to the 
other kind of expenditures. These results are available upon request. 
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democratization, which remains statistically significant for the first 4 years reaching its 
maximum in the second year after shock.  
These results show that positive development in democratic institutions leads to lower patronage 
spending and higher provision of goods and services which target a larger portion of population 
demands rather than meeting a small military group. Our results contribute to the literature on 
patronage and public goods provision under different political regimes in a developing country. 
Our main findings which support theoretical predictions of our model are robust to different 
specification of government spending and alternative political institution indicators. The results 
are not sensitive to the ordering of variables in the VAR analysis.  
Finally, our approach to this nexus has been also additionally motivated by recent significant 
international sanctions to change the political behavior of Iranian government. The positive 
shocks in political institutions that shape the government spending behavior of Iran can for 
example stem from exogenous pressures of economic sanctions or internal pressures of civil 
society. An interpretation can be that if the sanctions are successful to increase political openness 
in Iran in short run (as is shown in Dizaji and van Bergeijk, 2013), then one can also expect to 
see a reduction in allocated budget for military (patronage) and an increase in education 
expenditure in Iran. This allows us to also make conclusions about how negative shocks in 
political institutions through lifting exogenous pressures and/or marginalization of civil society 
and its idle status may reflect itself in spending structure of the state. Of course, more work on 
this remains to be done to reveal the indirect link between sanctions and its impact on economic 
development through the spending behavior of the government in the target country. 
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Appendix A. Summary Statistics- sample period: 1960-2006 
Variable | Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
ldefetot (log of Military expenditures / total 
expenditures) 
47 3.38 0.33 2.64 3.84 
ldiciptot (log of public order and disciplinary 
expenditures/ total expenditures) 
47 1.84 0.36 1.30 2.48 
ledutot (log of education expenditures/total 
expenditures) 
47 2.90 0.28 2.22 3.31 
lhelthtot (log of health and medical services  
expenditures/total expenditures) 
47 1.60 0.29 1.02 2.16 
lculttot (log of cultural and recreational services 
/total expenditures) 
47 0.61 0.29 0.13 1.14 
ldefegdp (log of Military expenditures / GDP) 47 1.45 0.53 0.72 2.31 
ldicipgdp (log of public order and disciplinary 
expenditures/ GDP) 
47 -0.09 0.41 -0.76 0.96 
ledugdp (log of education expenditures/GDP) 47 0.97 0.37 0.29 1.78 
lhelthgdp (log of health and medical services  
expenditures/GDP) 
47 -0.33 0.54 -1.32 0.57 
lcultgdp (log of cultural and recreational services 
/GDP) 
47 -1.32 0.45 -2.33 -0.61 
ldefecap (log of Military expenditures per capita) 46 2.95 0.71 1.58 4.25 
ldicipcap (log of public order and disciplinary 
expenditures per capita) 
46 1.40 0.48 0.70 2.51 
leducap (log of education expenditures per capita) 46 2.47 0.51 1.29 3.34 
lhelthcap (log of health and medical services  
expenditures per capita) 
46 1.18 0.68 -0.46 2.13 
lcultcap (log of cultural and recreational services 
per capita) 
46 0.19 0.68 -1.39 1.34 
polity index 47 -6.02 4.49 -10.00 3.00 
VI  (Vanhanen index of democracy) 47 1.87 1.79 0.00 6.10 
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Appendix B. Summary of main impulse response analyses 
Shock 
variable 
Method Specification Response (spending) variables
 
Disciplinary  Health Education Military Cultural 
Polity IRF % of total 
government 
spending 
positive positive positive negative insignificant 
Polity GIR % of total 
government 
spending 
positive positive positive negative insignificant 
VI IRF % of total 
government 
spending 
positive insignificant positive insignificant  insignificant 
MVI+ IRF % of total 
government 
spending 
positive insignificant positive negative insignificant 
MVI- IRF % of total 
government 
spending 
negative negative negative positive insignificant 
HIV+ IRF % of total 
government 
spending 
positive insignificant positive negative insignificant 
HIV- IRF % of total 
government 
spending 
negative insignificant negative insignificant negative 
Polity IRF % of GDP positive insignificant positive negative insignificant 
Polity IRF Per capita insignificant insignificant insignificant negative insignificant 
Note:  The table only reports the sign of the significant responses within 2, 3 or 4 years after the initial 
shocks. * VI represents the Vanhanen index.* MIV+ and MIV- represent the positive and 
negative changes of Vanhanen index according to Mork‟s definition. *HIV+ and HIV- 
represent the positive and negative changes of Vanhanen index according to Hamilton‟s 
definition. 
 
